中国肯定不是第一个试图去托起一个正在下跌的市场的国家。美国、欧洲和日本的央行都在崩盘后买入股票并下调利率以提振伤痕累累的投资者方面显露过身手。但是，具体的国情以及在过去10天中的介入方式使得中国成为这方面的一个外行，因而非常令人担心。

A red flag
　　红旗飘飘
　　CHINA is certainly not the first country to try to prop up a falling stockmarket. The central banks of America, Europe and Japan have all shown form in buying shares after crashes and cutting interest rates to cheer up bloodied investors. But the circumstances and the manner of China’s intervention of the past ten days make it an outlier, worryingly so.
　　中国肯定不是第一个试图去托起一个正在下跌的市场的国家。美国、欧洲和日本的央行都在崩盘后买入股票并下调利率以提振伤痕累累的投资者方面显露过身手。但是，具体的国情以及在过去10天中的介入方式使得中国成为这方面的一个外行，因而非常令人担心。
　　The trigger in China’s case is perplexing. Yes, the stockmarket is down a third over the past month, but that has simply taken it back to March levels; it is still up 80% over the last year. Growth, though slowing, has stabilised recently. Other asset markets are performing well. Property, long in the doldrums, is turning up. Money-market rates are low and steady, suggesting calm in the banking sector. The anticipated correction of over-valued stocks hardly seems cause for much anguish.
　　在中国案例中，触发点非常复杂。没错，股市的确在过去的一个月中下跌了三分之一，但是这仅仅是让市场回到了今年三月份的水平；仍然比去年高出80％。增长，尽管正在放慢，但最近已经企稳。其他的资产市场表现良好。长时间低迷的房地产正在转暖。货币市场利率处于低位且表现稳定，表明银行部门波澜不惊。预期中的过高估值的股票的调整几乎不能说是造成当前这种极端情况的原因。
　　Yet China’s intervention has screamed of panic. Had the central bank stopped at cutting interest rates—justifiable support for the economy when inflation is so low—that would have been reasonable. Instead, there has been a spectacle of ever-more drastic actions to save the market. Regulators capped short selling. Pension funds pledged to buy more stocks. The government suspended initial public offerings, limiting the supply of shares to drive up the prices of those already listed. Brokers created a fund to buy shares, backed by central-bank cash. All the while, state media played cheerleader. Far from saving the market from drowning, the succession of life buoys only pushed it further under water. The CSI 300, an index of China’s biggest-listed companies, fell almost 10% over seven trading days after the rate cut. ChiNext, an index of high-growth companies that is often described as China’s Nasdaq, fell by 25%.
　　然而，中国的介入却带来了惊声尖叫。倘若是央行停止降低利率——这在通胀处于低位时是对经济正确的支持方式——还情有可原。相反，人们看到的却是一种更为激烈的救市景象。监管者给卖空设定了上限；养老金基金做出了买入更多的股票的承诺；政府暂停了IPO，为了限制股票供应以推升业已上市的股票的价格；多家券商组建了一只基金去购买股票，得到了央行的现金支持。与此同时，国家媒体充当起了拉拉队的角色。但是，接二连三的救市措施不仅远未将已经溺水的市场拯救出来，反而是将其推入了更深的水中。在利率下调后的7个交易日中，中国大型上市公司指数——沪深300下跌了将近10％，常被称为中国纳斯达克的高增长企业指数——创业板下跌了25％。
　　Theories have flourished about why the government has waded in so heavily. The apparent desperation is, some believe, a sign that officials see a looming economic collapse, and are trying to staunch the wound before social upheaval ensues. That story is intriguing, but it is not the most likely.
　　各种有关政府为何要如此重手介入的理论大量地冒了出来。一种显而易见的绝望是：有些人认为，这是政府看到了一场渐行渐进的经济崩溃，并试图在随之而来的社会动荡之前治好伤口的一个信号。这种说法很有吸引力，但这是最不可能的。
　　Lost in all the drama about the stockmarket is that it still plays a surprisingly small role in China. The free-float value of Chinese markets—the amount available for trading—is just about a third of GDP, compared with more than 100% in developed economies. Less than 15% of household financial assets are invested in the stockmarket: which is why soaring shares did little to boost consumption and crashing prices will do little to hurt it. Many stocks were bought on debt, and the unwinding of these loans helps explain why the government has been unable to stop the rout. But this financing is not a systemic risk; it is just about 1.5% of total assets in the banking system.
　　被所有有关股市的故事所遗漏的一点是：股市，在中国，仍然令人吃惊地扮演着一个小角色。中国市场的自由流通市值，即可以交易的总市值，仅为GDP的三分之一。相比之下，发达经济体为100％以上。被投到股市中的钱不到家庭金融资产的15%：这正是为什么股票疯涨对刺激消费贡献很小，而股价暴跌几乎不会伤及消费的原因。许多股票都是用借来的钱买的，而这些贷款的放松也有助于解释为什么政府没能让溃败停下来。但是，这种融资不是一种系统性的风险；它仅占银行体系总资产的1.5%。
　　If economic stability is not in peril, why then the panic? The most compelling explanation is politics. The government has staked much credibility and prestige on the stockmarket. When the going was still good, the official press was chock-a-block with articles about how the rally reflected the economic reforms that Xi Jinping, China’s top leader, was set to push. Li Keqiang, the premier, said repeatedly that he wanted equity markets to provide a bigger share of corporate financing—comments, from punters’ perspective, not unlike waving a red cape in front of a bull. The sudden end to the rally is the first major dent in the public standing of the Xi-Li team. The botched attempts to stabilise the market only make them look weaker, giving succour to their critics.
　　如果经济稳定不存在问题，那么，为什么会恐慌呢？最具说服力的解释是政治。政府已经在股市上押注了太多的信任和声望。当一切尚好时，官方媒体上铺天盖地的都是上涨反应了中国最高领导人习近平所推动的经济改革的文章。总理李克强曾反复表示，他希望证券市场能够为企业提供更多的融资——从赌客的角度看，各种评论完全就是在一头牛面前挥舞的那块红布。涨势的嘎然而止是习李团队在公众面前的首个主要挫折。搞砸了的稳定市场的尝试只会让他们看上去更加虚弱，给他们的批评者提供口实。
　　But the biggest concern about the panicked policy response is what it says about the government’s agenda. The economic hopes invested in Messrs Xi and Li stemmed from their pledge in late 2013 to let market forces play a “decisive role” in allocating resources. The actions of the past ten days have made abundantly clear that it is still the other way around: the Chinese government wants a decisive role in markets.
　　但是，有关惊慌失措的政策应对的最大担忧是在政府议程方面。投资在习李团队身上的经济希望来源于他们在2013年做出的让市场在分配资源方面扮演“决定性角色”的承诺。但是，过去10天的行动再明白不过地表明事实并非如此：中国政府想在市场中扮演一个决定性的角色。